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a b s t r a c t 
This paper compares the policy of selling a product to that of installed base management, in which the 
manufacturer leases the product to consumers, and bundles repair and maintenance services along with 
the product. We compare the two policies in a monopolistic setting when a firm uses either one of the 
policies, and when both policies are used by a single firm. We then compare the policies under com- 
petition first when two firms use identical products, and when two firms use vertically differentiated 
products. Our findings indicate that the selling option dominates the installed base option in a monopo- 
listic environment, even for significant values of remanufacturing savings from the installed base policy. 
In a competitive environment, if two firms use identical products, we find that the two firms use only 
differentiated pure strategies (where one firm uses installed base management and the other uses sell- 
ing), or the outcome is a mixed equilibrium, where each firm uses each pure strategy with a certain 
probability. We find that the firm using the installed base management policy in the duopoly with iden- 
tical products performs better than the firm using the selling policy. In a competitive market where both 
firms use vertically differentiated products, we find that both firms can use both mechanisms of installed 
base management and selling in equilibrium. However, we find that the profits from the installed base 
segments of the two firms are higher than the profits from the selling segments. Our results indicate that 
the selling policy performs better in a monopolistic environment while the installed base policy performs 
better in a competitive environment. 
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Installed base management, the policy in which a manufacturer 
leases the product to customers and bundles repair and mainte- 
nance services along with the product, is an old industry prac- 
tice. From the manufacturer’s perspective, she can gain revenues 
from the customer’s use of the product, in addition to a stream 
of revenues from maintenance and servicing, while retaining own- 
ership of the product. From the customer’s perspective, he can 
pay a lower rent for the product during the period of use (com- 
pared to the price paid for owning the product), and can also gain 
the advantage of not paying for servicing or maintenance costs 
on an uncertain basis, e.g., when the product breaks down. Cus- 
tomers can also benefit from using a product based on the lat- 
est technology, rather than being “locked in” to a previous genera- 
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tion of the product. There are examples from various industries of 
manufacturers using the policy of installed base management. For 
instance, in the IT industry, IBM, Unisys Corporation and Sun Mi- 
crosystems use the strategy of installed base management exten- 
sively ( Vaas, 1999 ). Another prime example is Cisco’s success in 
the Indian telecom market. Cisco’s previous model was built on 
selling its products and offering its maintenance services using a 
servicing contract. In short, Cisco was a master at selling and mov- 
ing boxes. Entering the very competitive Indian market required 
a completely new business model, and Cisco used a turn-key ser- 
vice solution in which customers were going to pay for products 
based on the period the products were leased for, with mainte- 
nance costs included in the leasing contract. Cisco realized that 
a model built on operating expenditures (OPEX) in preference to 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) would be the preferred vehicle for 
cash constrained operators. This new business model allowed Cisco 
to capture a high market share in a market where the original gov- 
ernment monopoly has been replaced by a very competitive mar- 
ketplace with customers having a choice from 6 -12 operators in 
different parts of India ( Das Ghosal & Padmanabhan, 2009 ). A third 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.038 
0377-2217/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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example is the use of installed base management for vehicle fleets. 
Dawson (2014) reports that there is a dichotomy of practices in 
vehicle fleet management, where two kinds of contracts are pri- 
marily offered: the first kind of contract is the leasing with an all- 
inclusive maintenance contract, and the second kind of contract is 
selling the vehicle with a pay-as-you-go contract for servicing. In 
the all-inclusive maintenance contract that is effectively a repre- 
sentation of installed base management, the firm uses a policy of 
offering a fixed-cost, maintenance-inclusive contract hire package 
that charges a regular amount per month per vehicle to cover all 
routine SMR (service, maintenance and repair) costs whether re- 
quired or not, and also include a level of built-in contingency for 
any ad hoc work that may be required. In contrast, in the pay-as- 
you-go service, a certain amount of servicing is included for free, 
and beyond the base usage, all servicing instances of the vehicles 
are charged to the consumers. In this paper, we study when the 
leasing policy with the flat-fee contract with all maintenance in- 
cluded should be used, and when the firm should sell the product 
to consumers with variable maintenance costs to be paid by the 
consumer as and when required. 
In addition to facing a high degree of competition, firms such 
as Cisco operate in an industry of highly commoditized products. 
Cisco’s offerings of bundles of products with services offers an 
opportunity for the firm to differentiate its offered services from 
competitors. In general, for durable products that are commodi- 
tized, e.g., electronic durables such as copiers, printers, the scope 
for differentiation from competitors along product features is not 
high, as the technology and the quality of components available 
from suppliers are almost uniform (features such as printing qual- 
ity, processing power, maintenance costs, are not based on propri- 
etary technology but on open industry standards). The trend to- 
wards bundling the product with maintenance services is a way 
for manufacturers to differentiate themselves from others in an 
industry with shrinking profit margins and intense competition. 
In the IT industry, several companies are developing technologies 
to help firms adopt installed base management and service their 
installed base population better and cheaper. There are a num- 
ber of studies in the marketing literature that analyze the bene- 
fits of installed base management to the competitiveness of the 
firm ( Dasgupta, Sidarth, & Silva-Risso, 2007 ). Desai and Purohit 
(1999) investigate how the proportion of leases and sales affects 
a manufacturer’s ability to compete in the auto market, and find 
that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the 
competitiveness of the market. Desai and Purohit (1998) show that 
selling may be better than leasing if sold units depreciate signif- 
icantly faster than leased units. The choice between leasing and 
selling is also affected by the existence of complementary prod- 
ucts, Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) show that when there are com- 
plementary products that exist or can be introduced in the future, 
the leasing mechanism works better than the selling mechanism 
in alleviating inter-temporal price discrimination problems for the 
customer. Erat and Bhaskaran (2012) show that the value of the 
products may be further enhanced by providing the option of up- 
grading the base product later, this also impacts the selling ver- 
sus leasing decision. There are also a number of studies that con- 
sider maintenance contracts as a strategic tool for gaining higher 
market share. Day and Fox (1985) provide a menu of different ser- 
vice contracts offered by manufacturers, retailers and third parties, 
and identify successful contracting situations for maintenance ser- 
vices. Guiltinan (1987) provides a pricing framework for bundles of 
services and/or products. Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) compare 
the offering of extended service contracts to risk averse and risk 
neutral consumers, and find that risk averse consumers are more 
likely to purchase extended service contracts. Rabetino, Kohtamaki, 
Lehtonen, and Kostama (2015) analyze the impact of lifecycle ser- 
vices on the firm’s competitiveness. While this stream of literature 
takes into account servicing contracts resulting in a higher cus- 
tomer utility, they do not account for the maintenance cost ben- 
efits of installed base management. 
The manufacturer has a number of reasons to use the strat- 
egy of installed base management for durable products. Firstly, 
she can obtain a second revenue stream from servicing the prod- 
uct. Customers who use the manufacturer’s servicing contract pro- 
vide the manufacturer with a steady stream of revenues over the 
product’s life-cycle ( Lieckens, Colen, & Lambrecht, 2015; Wise & 
Baumgartner, 1999 ). The revenue from servicing the customer 
could be a significant source of income in industries such as the 
auto industry where profit margins are low ( McGeer, 2004 ). A sec- 
ond advantage of using the installed base policy is the role of the 
maintenance contract. It creates brand loyalty for the manufacturer 
that extends into future generations of products ( Hunsaker, 20 0 0; 
Patterson, 1998 ). A third advantage for the manufacturer is that 
she can obtain economies of scale in servicing multiple customers 
by having a fixed team for providing maintenance services. The 
manufacturer also obtains from leasing the option to reuse parts 
from end-of-lease products in product remanufacturing. 
Other examples of firms preferring leasing products to selling 
products include United Shoe Machinery Corporation, and Xerox 
for copiers ( Waldman, 1997 ). Around 1960, Xerox was one of the 
first firms to introduce a policy of leasing only and of internal- 
izing the maintenance of its copying machines. Manufacturers in 
the car industry have also practiced installed base management 
for more than a decade ( Silvey, 2002 ). In the elevator industry, 
Thyssenkrupp and Otis ( The Economist, 1996 ) used the installed 
base policy to transform themselves from pure manufacturers to 
service providers. In the economics literature, the aspect of leasing 
of the installed base management policy and its comparison to the 
selling policy has been studied extensively from the perspective of 
the durable goods monopolist. Waldman (2003) provides a broad 
survey of the extant literature. However, while this stream of liter- 
ature on leasing in economics studies the inter-temporal benefits 
of leasing, it does not take into account the offering of mainte- 
nance services in conjunction with the leasing policy and its effects 
on competition. 
In the operations literature, maintenance and repair policies 
have been studied to find optimal maintenance frequencies, con- 
tractual incentive structures, and to identify the best agents for 
maintenance. De Giovanni, Reddy, and Zaccour (2016) study in- 
centive structures to increase the product rate of return for re- 
manufacturing in closed-loop supply chains. Cohen and Whang 
(1997) consider a lifecycle model of a service contract, in con- 
junction with selling the product, in which the servicing con- 
tract is offered in competition with a third party operator. Yalabik, 
Chhajed, and Petruzzi (2014) , Kim, Cohen, and Netessine (2007) , 
Ryall and Sampson. (2009) , and Tarakci, Tang, Moskowitz, and 
Plante (2006) study incentive issues for maintenance contracts 
when the service is offered by a third party provider, while 
Tseng, Tang, Moskowitz, and Plante (2009) study outsourcing 
maintenance contracts for new technology adoptions. Groenevelt, 
Pintelon, and Seidmann (1992) find optimal product lot sizes 
with machine breakdowns. Robotis, Bhattacharya, and Wassenhove 
(2012) study the case where a monopolist leases the product to 
consumers, and bundles repair and maintenance services along 
with the product and they find the optimal pricing during the 
product’s lifecycle and the optimal leasing duration. This stream 
of literature does not take competition into account. 
In the IT literature, there are a number of studies that show 
that installed base management introduces positive network 
externalities that help in creating industry standards owing to 
compatibility after an innovation ( Cheng & Tang, 2010; Farrell & 
Saloner, 1986; Xie & Sirbu, 1995 ). These effects have been 
empirically tested in various industries such as software 
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( Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996 ) and video games ( Shankar & 
Bayus, 20 03 ). Schilling (20 02) provides an overview of the litera- 
ture in this field and finds that the firm’s learning orientation and 
timing of entry also affects its ability to define the dominant de- 
sign, in addition to the installed base. Focused on the video game 
industry, Chao and Derdenger (2013) analyze mixed bundling in 
two-sided markets where installed base effects are present and 
that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as 
well as the standard two-sided markets literature. In this paper, 
we consider installed base management for commoditized hard- 
ware products primarily, where technological compatibility and 
network externalities are less likely to drive the installed base 
policies, hence, we do not take network externalities into account. 
We make this assumption to keep the model tractable, and it can 
be relaxed easily. 
In this paper we seek an answer to the following question: 
when is the installed base management policy more profitable 
than selling? We compare the two policies in monopolistic and 
competitive environments with firms choosing either identical 
products or differentiated products. We find that while the sell- 
ing policy is better in a monopolistic environment, the installed 
base policy is better in a competitive environment. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the 
conceptualization of the model and Section 3 to the model results 
under the assumption of a monopolistic environment. Section 4 in- 
troduces the competitive models with identical and differentiated 
products. We outline the contributions and limitations of this work 
in Section 5 and provide possible directions for future research. 
We now describe the model formulation and solution in detail. 
2. Model description 
To model the demand functions for the cases of installed base 
management and selling, we assume for the sake of tractability 
that consumers have linear utility functions. Consider a consumer 
who wants to either buy or use a durable product, such as a copier 
or a PC. We model that the consumer will choose the option that 
provides him with the highest surplus, which is given by the dif- 
ference between the utility of the product and either the price paid 
when the consumer purchases the product and the expected ser- 
vice cost in the selling model, or the rent in the installed base 
management model. The utility derived from the product is mod- 
eled by the usage frequency of the product. For a given product, 
this model is appropriate as consumers are not distinguishing be- 
tween different products, but rather choosing the mode of use 
of the product e.g., consumers want copies of documents from a 
copier, or want to use a medium-sized car, and can either purchase 
or lease the copier or the car. Hence, the more often they use the 
car or the copier, the higher the utility. Note that the model of 
utility used here is different from the model of instantaneous util- 
ity used in the literature (for example, a video rental provides util- 
ity instantaneously, hence the utility is zero after the product or 
service is consumed). In this paper, we model the utility of prod- 
ucts like copiers and PCs that provide utility a multiple number of 
times based on usage. 
The difference between the selling and installed base mecha- 
nisms is in the contractual structure offered by the firm. If the con- 
sumer chooses the installed base mechanism offered by the firm, 
the firm effectively leases the product to the consumer, and the 
ownership of the product rests with the firm. The consumer then 
leases the product along with the servicing contract, and is a part 
of the installed base population. Based on our observations in the 
industry, the firm offers the installed base option to the consumer 
as an all-inclusive contract, i.e., the consumer pays a fixed rental 
price for the usage of the product during the time horizon, with 
the added utility that he will have the product serviced whenever 
and as often as needed. In our model, the frequency of breakdown 
and repair is proportional to the usage frequency of the prod- 
uct. Thus the more often the durable product is used, the more 
likely it is that it will break down. This assumption is intuitive for 
all durable products. However, there are cases in which products 
break down if they have not been used for a long period of time. 
Hence, we also assume that the usage of the product is uniform 
during the period, which is not a strong assumption. Hence, con- 
sumers with a high usage frequency will prefer to lease the prod- 
uct and be a part of the installed base, as they anticipate that they 
are more likely to need the service. 
If the consumer prefers the selling mechanism, he purchases 
the product along with a servicing contract from the firm, the ser- 
vicing contract is based on the usage frequency of the consumer. 
The selling and servicing contract works as follows: the consumer 
pays the firm an upfront price for the product, and the owner- 
ship of the product is transferred to the consumer. If the consumer 
uses the product up to a threshold value of usage frequency, the 
firm services the product for free. If the consumer uses the prod- 
uct with a higher frequency than the threshold value, the firm 
charges the consumer a variable tariff for the excess usage beyond 
the threshold ( Tucker, 2007 ). As we show in Section 3.1.3 , con- 
sumers with a high usage frequency will lease the product while 
consumers with medium usage frequency will prefer to purchase 
the product since it is unlikely that they are going to need ser- 
vice often and they are not willing to pay a premium rental price. 
Finally, consumers with very low valuations will neither purchase 
nor lease products, as the rent in the installed base model or the 
price in the selling model will be too high for their surplus to be 
positive. While every consumer knows how often he might use 
the product, the manufacturer does not. She cannot perfectly dis- 
criminate among consumers based on their usage and service re- 
quirements. However, we assume that she knows the distribution 
of the usage frequencies of the entire set of consumers. We note 
that, the manufacturer can potentially lease the product by the fre- 
quency of usage e.g., mileage on cars, number of copies on copiers, 
or the number of times a movie in DVD format is watched during 
the leasing period. However, in most real life scenarios, the rent is 
fixed on a per period basis. 
Based on these observations, we now introduce some notation 
and assumptions. 
Notation and assumptions 
1. The utility that consumers derive from using the product de- 
pends on the frequency with which they use the product. Let v 
be the frequency of usage per period. We assume that across 
the entire set of consumers v is uniformly distributed and 
normalized between 0 and 1 ( v ∼ U[0 , 1]) , with 1 being the 
highest frequency possible (the manufacturer knows this dis- 
tribution of frequency of usage). The assumption of uniformly 
distributed consumers is common in the literature and allows 
for tractability. We assume that v is also the per period proba- 
bility that a consumer with usage frequency v will need service. 
Thus the more often the product is used, the higher is the prob- 
ability of a breakdown or a service request from the consumer 
in every period. 
2. While the manufacturer can gain a steady stream of revenues 
by offering a servicing contract, servicing involves costly oper- 
ations. Servicing examples, depending on the product, include 
repair, software installation and upgrades, etc. Let x be the cost 
of servicing a consumer if a breakdown occurs. A durable used 
by a consumer with usage v will on expectation need cost of 
servicing x v . We note that, the intuition behind our results will 
not change if we assume that x increases in a convex way as 
v increases. A consumer who is part of the installed base will 
have a utility v per period, and pay a fixed rent per period that 
Please cite this article as: S. Bhattacharya et al., Installed base management versus selling in monopolistic and competitive environments, 
European Journal of Operational Research (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.038 
4 S. Bhattacharya et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 0 0 0 (2018) 1–12 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: EOR [m5G; September 28, 2018;16:4 ] 
includes servicing. We also assume that the length of the period 
is much longer than the total turnaround time of maintenance, 
so we do not consider downtime costs in this model. 
3. Let r denote the rent a consumer in the installed base pays per 
period, p the selling price of the product and s the per unit ser- 
vice price charged by the firm if it uses the selling mechanism. 
We denote IB as the profits of the installed base policy and 
SE as the profits of the selling policy. 
4. We assume that the cost of servicing x and the production cost 
c are the same for the installed base policy and the selling pol- 
icy. While the production cost being the same is true by as- 
sumption (same product), the cost of servicing is likely to be 
lower for the installed base management policy, as the man- 
ufacturer has better design knowledge of the product. For the 
sake of comparison, we assume that they are the same. To avoid 
trivial solutions we also assume that x + c < 1 so that there is 
positive demand. 
5. We assume that the benefit of remanufacturing the product is 
much greater for the installed base policy than the selling pol- 
icy, as the firm retains the ownership of the product. In our 
observations in the industry, the remanufacturing of products 
in the installed base policy is close to 100%, as the ownership 
of the product rests with the manufacturer. For tractability, we 
assume that there are no secondary markets available to con- 
sumers to extract value from products at the end of the time 
horizon. 
In the following sections, we will examine and compare the 
policies of installed base management in monopolistic and com- 
petitive environments. 
3. Model formulation and analysis 
In this section, we compare the policies of installed base man- 
agement and selling in a two-period horizon, with the selling con- 
tract and installed base management contract only being offered 
at the beginning of the first period. It is well-known that inter- 
temporal utility maximization favors the installed base manage- 
ment model over the selling model, we want to focus on short 
term horizons. 
3.1. Installed base management vs selling in monopoly 
In the monopoly framework, we consider a manufacturer who 
uses (i) installed base management only, (ii) selling only, and (iii) a 
combination of installed base management and selling. Finally, we 
also analyze a duopoly where one party uses installed base man- 
agement only and the other party uses selling only. 
3.1.1. Installed base management 
A consumer with utility v = v r in each period will be part of 
the installed base only if he has a positive surplus from leasing the 
product which implies that (1 + δ)(v r − r) ≥ 0 . Thus the marginal 
consumer has utility v r = r. Since the firm retains the ownership 
of the product, let the value to the firm from remanufacturing the 
product at the end of the first period be V , for durable commodi- 
tized products, the remanufacturing savings V models the benefit 
of the installed base policy, the higher the volume of consumers in 
the installed base, the higher the value to the manufacturer from 
the remanufacturing savings. A high value of V will also be passed 
on to the consumer by a lower rent, r . A manufacturer that follows 




IB = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} − x (1 + δ) 
∫ 1 
v r 
ydy + δ(1 − v r ) V 
s.t. v r = r (1) 
The term x 
∫ 1 
v r ydy denotes the cost of servicing the portion [ v r , 1] 
of the market. The total cost of servicing is found by integrating 
the cost of servicing over the continuum of consumers with utili- 
ties that range from [ v r , 1] . Also note that the expected cost of ser- 
vicing is a non-linear function of the market share that the man- 
ufacturer services. To see this, let m r = 1 − v r denote the portion 
of the market that is part of the installed base and notice that 
x 
∫ 1 
v r ydy = x 2 (1 − v 2 r ) = x 2 m r (2 − m r ) . The optimal rental price and 
profits are given by the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. The optimal r that maximizes problem (1) is given 
by r ∗ = (1+ δ)+ c−δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) and the optimal profits are given by 
∗
IB = 
[(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c+ δV ] 2 
2(1+ δ)(2 −x ) . 
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
Notice that the optimal rental price r ∗ = (1+ δ)+ c−δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) increases 
non-linearly with the cost of servicing x . The market share of 
the installed base under the optimal rental price is m ∗r = 1 − r ∗ = 
(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c+ δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) , and decreases rapidly as the servicing costs x in- 
crease. 
3.1.2. Selling 
In this case, the firm’s contract to consumers is modeled as 
follows. The firm offers the product to the consumer at a selling 
price of p , and free servicing for the usage of the product up to 
a maximum frequency of usage of v b , corresponding to the mini- 
mum frequency of usage of the adopting consumers (marginal con- 
sumer). For a frequency of usage beyond this threshold frequency 
of v b , the firm charges the consumer a servicing charge of s per 
unit frequency of usage. It is easy to show that the manufacturer 
will optimally provide free servicing only for consumers up to the 
maximum frequency of usage of v b , the frequency of usage of 
the marginal consumer, as this enables the manufacturer to ex- 
tract the complete utility surplus of all adopting consumers. The 
consumer’s surplus utility is then modeled as: (1 + δ) v − p − (1 + 
δ) s (v − v b ) . To find the marginal consumer, the consumer whose 
usage frequency satisfies (1 + δ) v b − s (1 + δ)(v b − v b ) − p = 0 is 
indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing the product. The 
manufacturer’s problem is: 
max 
p,s 
SE = max 
p,s 
SE = (1 − v b )(p − c) 










s.t. v b (1 + δ) − p = 0 (2) 
The optimal values of p , s , and SE are given by the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2. The optimal parameters that maximize problem 
(2) are given by p ∗ = c 1 −x , s ∗ = 1 , and v b = p 
∗
(1+ δ) . The optimal profits 
are given by ∗
SE = [(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c] 
2 
2(1 −x )(1+ δ) . 
Note that if we compare the profits of selling only with those 
of installed base given by Propositions (1) and (2) respectively, we 
can see trivially that SE ≥IB if the salvage value of the prod- 
uct due to remanufacturing is low, while the reverse is true if the 
salvage value of the product due to remanufacturing is high. The 
property of selling dominating installed base management is not 
an artifact caused by the uniform distribution of usage frequency, 
the property follows from the fact that the seller uses a two-part 
tariff, as it charges a price as well as a servicing charge from the 
consumer, while the installed base policy uses a one-part tariff
(absorbing the servicing costs and the rent for using the product 
in a single payment r ). The property of selling dominating installed 
base management in a single-period formulation also holds when 
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there is a salvage value of the product at the end of the period, 
which is obtained by selling the product to secondary markets. The 
introduction of secondary markets for the selling case will move it 
closer to the installed base management case in terms of obtaining 
the benefits of the salvage value. The case in which the consumer 
purchases the product in the first period and then sells it in the 
secondary market in the beginning of the second period is similar 
to leasing, as the consumer pays a rent of the difference between 
the price of purchase and the salvage value at the end of the first 
period. Also note that since the optimal servicing charge is given 
by s ∗ = 1 , the manufacturer can extract all the surplus utility from 
consumers using the two-part tariff, while she has to leave some 
surplus to consumers if she uses the installed base policy. 
3.1.3. Installed base management and selling in a monopoly 
In this subsection, it is assumed that the manufacturer uses 
both the installed base and selling policies simultaneously. Note 
that the utility of the consumer from the installed base policy with 
a frequency of usage of v is given by: U(IB ) = (1 + δ)(v − r) and 
the corresponding utility of the consumer from the selling policy is 
given by: U(S) = (1 + δ) v − p − s (1 + δ)(v − v b ) . For consumers to 
prefer the installed base policy over the selling policy, U ( IB ) > U ( S ) 
implies that v > v b + (1+ δ) r−p s (1+ δ) . 
Hence, consumers with a high frequency of usage will adopt 
the installed base policy, and consumers with lower frequency of 
usage will buy the product. We now find the respective market 
shares of the selling and installed base policies. Let v r be the valu- 
ation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between pur- 
chasing the product and being in the installed base, and let v b 
be the valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent be- 
tween purchasing or not purchasing the product. Then, for the con- 
sumer with a usage frequency of v r , (1 + δ)(v r − r) = (1 + δ) v r −
p − s (1 + δ)(v r − v b ) . Thus the consumer with a usage frequency 
of v r = v b + 
r− p 
1+ δ
s will be indifferent between buying and leas- 
ing the product. On the other hand, if v b is the valuation of the 
marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing or not 
purchasing the product, then (1 + δ) v b − p − s (1 + δ)(v b − v b ) = 0 
or v b = p 1+ δ . Thus the market is divided as follows: consumers 
with usage frequencies ranging from [ v b + r−v b s , 1] will be part of 
the installed base; consumers with usage frequencies ranging from 
[ p 
1+ δ , v b + 
r−v b 
s ] will purchase the product; consumers with usage 
frequencies ranging from [0 , p 
1+ δ ] will not use the product at all. 
It is important to note that more than half of the firms that have 
a copier in-house prefer to lease them with an installed base con- 
tract covering the maintenance compared to purchasing them ( CBS, 
2014 ), for high frequency users, the advantages of having the main- 
tenance included in the contract lowers the payments on mainte- 
nance. Users with lower frequency of usage may not need mainte- 
nance as frequently, hence, they prefer to purchase the copier and 
pay for the maintenance as and when required by adopting the 
selling mechanism. Altman and Chu (2001) and Balasubramanian, 
Bhattacharya, and Krishnan (2015) also find that consumers with 
high frequency of usage prefer a flat fee pricing structure, while 
consumers with low frequency of usage prefer a pay-as-you-go 
mechanism for pricing. However, in practice, customers with very 
high usage frequencies may sometimes prefer to have either an in 
house maintenance staff or have a contract with a third party to 
maintain the product if the time of repair is of critical importance, 
we do not consider factors other than maintenance cost in the pa- 
per. The manufacturer’s maximization problem is: 
max 
r,p 
IB and SE = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} 
−(1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
v r 
ydy + δ(1 − v r ) V (3) 
+(v r − v b )(p − c) + (1 + δ) 
{
s 
∫ v r 
v b 
(v − v b ) d v − x 
∫ v r 
v b 
v d v 
}
s.t. v r = p 
1 + δ + 
r − p 
1+ δ
s 
and v b = 
p 
1 + δ (4) 
The optimal values of r, p, s, v r , v b and the optimal profits for prob- 
lem (3) are given by the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. The solution to problem (3) is 
r ∗ = 1 − δV 
1 + δ and p 
∗ = c 
1 − x and s = 1 
v ∗r = 1 −
δV 




(1 + δ)(1 − x ) 
The optimal profits are given by ∗
IB and SE = 
[(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c−δV (1 −x )] 2 
2(1 −x )(1+ δ) + 
δV 
1+ δ { 1 + δ − c − x + δV x 2(1+ δ) } . 
Proposition (3) states that it is always optimal for a manufac- 
turer to choose a mixed strategy of installed base management 
and selling if the product has a positive value at the end of the 
first period due to remanufacturing savings, and to use a selling 
strategy only if this value V is equal to zero. The intuition behind 
Proposition (3) is as follows: when the manufacturer uses the in- 
stalled base policy, she internalizes the cost of providing mainte- 
nance services to the consumer, and hence charges a higher rent. 
Consequently, the constraint of providing the maintenance service 
reduces the market share of the manufacturer. In contrast, if she 
sells the product, she extracts the entire surplus utility of the con- 
sumer, by using the maximum value possible for the servicing 
charge, and hence, she charges a lower selling price, and has a 
higher market share. Therefore, using both strategies together is 
the optimal policy. Propositions (1) –(3) show that in a monopo- 
listic environment, the optimal strategy for a manufacturer is to 
follow the selling strategy if the salvage value of the product from 
the installed base policy at the end of the life-cycle is zero, and 
use both strategies in tandem if the product has a positive salvage 
value. The intuition comes from the fact that a manufacturer who 
follows the installed base management policy faces a lower market 
share to account for servicing. 
4. Installed base management and selling in a competitive 
environment 
In this section, we compare the use of installed base manage- 
ment and selling in a duopoly. In the first section, we assume that 
both firms offer identical products, (i.e., both products are verti- 
cally undifferentiated), while in the next section, we assume that 
both firms offer vertically differentiated products (the utility from 
using one firm’s product is A times the utility of the other, A > 1). 
4.1. Competition between firms using vertically undifferentiated 
products 
Consider a duopoly between two firms with both firms offering 
the same product to consumers with potentially different mecha- 
nisms (installed base management and selling only, or any com- 
bination of the two). The firms first choose their mechanism(s) of 
offering the durable good, followed by the respective rents, sell- 
ing prices and service charges in the second stage (see Coughlan, 
1985 for similar two-stage games) with one firm following the in- 
stalled base management policy and the other following the sell- 
ing policy (both firms follow pure strategies). We first show that 
no Nash equilibrium exists when the two firms either use the 
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same mechanism or both mechanisms (see Result 1 in the Ap- 
pendix). If both firms employ the same mechanism, they com- 
pete in a Bertrand fashion on the basis of prices only, and there 
exists no Bertrand equilibrium for firms offering identical prod- 
ucts with the same mechanism that are differentiated on the ba- 
sis of prices only. Each firm finds it optimal to lower its price 
to get the entire market share, leading the game to have a no 
Nash equilibrium with positive profits for both firms. The firms can 
only have a Nash equilibrium outcome when they employ differ- 
ent mechanisms as the different prices charged under the differ- 
ent mechanisms enables them to move away from the Bertrand 
competition model. Let v r be the usage frequency of the con- 
sumer who is indifferent between being a member of the installed 
base and purchasing the product. Then, as in the monopoly case, 
we have (1 + δ)(v r − r) = (1 + δ) v r − p − s (1 + δ)(v r − v b ) , yield- 
ing v r = v b + r−v b s . For the marginal consumer in the selling case, 
we have (1 + δ) v b − p − s (1 + δ)(v b − v b ) = 0 or v b = p 1+ δ . We as- 
sume that the two firms engage in price competition, hence they 
simultaneously maximize their profits. The competition problem in 
pure strategies is given by: 
max 
r 




+ δ(1 − v r ) V 
max 
p,s 
SE = (v r − v b )(p − c) 
+(1 + δ) 
{
s 
∫ v r 
v b 
(v − v b ) dv − x 




s.t. v r = p 
1 + δ + 
r − p 
1+ δ
s 
and v b = 
p 
1 + δ (5) 
The optimal r , p , IB , SE are given by the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. The solution is based on the value of the servicing 
cost x , and is given by: 
Case 1: If 1 2 ≤ x ≤ 1 − c, then the Nash equilibrium values of the 
rent, selling price and servicing charge set by the two firms are given 
by: r ∗ = (1+ δ)+ c−δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) , p 
∗ = c 
(1 −x ) , s 
∗ = 1 . The equilibrium profits are 
given by: ∗IB = [(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c+ δV ] 
2 
2(1+ δ)(2 −x ) , 
∗
SE = [(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c−δV (1 −x )] 
2 
2(1+ δ)(1 −x )(2 −x ) 2 . The 
firm offering the installed base policy has the same profits as in the 
case when it offered the installed base option alone in a monopoly, 
whereas the firm using the selling policy has lower profits than if it 
used the selling policy alone in a monopoly. 
Case 2: If x < 1 2 , then in equilibrium, the selling firm sets s 
∗ = 
0 , and p ∗ = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 
(2 −x ) . The firm offering the installed base policy 
sets r ∗ = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) − ε, ε → 0 . The equilibrium profits are given by: 
∗
IB = [2(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c] δV (1+ δ)(2 −x ) , ∗SE = 0 . 
From Proposition (4) , we see that if the cost of servicing is 
high, then the selling firm extracts all the surplus utility of con- 
sumers in equilibrium, however, this strategy gives the selling firm 
a smaller share of the profits, as consumers with higher usage 
frequencies prefer to use the installed base option, which leaves 
consumers with some surplus utility. As the selling firm’s market 
share consists of those consumers with medium usage frequencies 
( 0 < v b < v r ), she does not have high profits in equilibrium. In con- 
trast, the firm using the installed base policy has its market share 
among consumers with high usage frequencies, hence, in equilib- 
rium, the firm using the installed base policy does better than the 
selling firm. 
If the servicing cost is low, the firm choosing the selling policy 
in equilibrium chooses not to extract the surplus utility from the 
consumer as in the monopoly cases. The firm using the selling op- 
tion now has an incentive to lower the servicing charge s , as low- 
ering s increases her market share. In the Nash equilibrium, both 
Fig. 1. Market shares for firms A and B for low values of A . 
firms offer a higher utility surplus for the consumer compared to 
the monopoly cases. While this is intuitive and in consonance with 
the literature (consumers get a higher utility surplus in competi- 
tive markets than in monopolistic markets), it is interesting to note 
that the lower service charge results in a reduced degree of differ- 
entiation of the selling and installed base mechanisms ( s = 0 im- 
plies that both firms use a single tariff structure). This lower de- 
gree of differentiation results in both firms competing on cost in 
equilibrium, and the firm offering the installed base policy can of- 
fer a lower rent to the consumer owing to the remanufacturing 
savings V , hence, the profits for the firm offering the installed base 
policy are increasing in V . The intuition behind this result is as fol- 
lows: the selling option is dominant in the monopoly setting as 
the firm can extract all the consumer surplus with the servicing 
charge. However, in the duopoly, the firm offering the selling op- 
tion is constrained by a lower market share (the firm offering the 
installed base option offers consumers a positive utility surplus), 
hence, the firm offering the selling option has to offer consumers a 
higher utility surplus as well, resulting in a lower servicing charge 
and profits. 
Proposition 5. Let the profit of the selling firm in the pure strategy 
equilibrium be SE and the profit of the firm using the installed base 
mechanism be IB . In the competitive game with vertically undif- 
ferentiated goods, there also exists a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, where each firm chooses the selling mechanism with a 
probability of σSE = SE SE +IB and the installed base mechanism with 
a probability of σIB = IB SE +IB . 
The existence of the mixed-strategy model is based on the ex- 
istence of pure strategies which are differentiated ( Dixit & Shapiro, 
1986 ) in the classic “Battle of the Sexes” Game. In the mixed- 
strategy outcome, the probability that both firms will eventually 
have different pure strategies is given by 2 σSE (1 − σSE ) . The ob- 
vious shortcoming of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is that firms 
are not able to guess a priori the mechanism that will be used by 
the competitor, but that problem exists even if both firms do not 
signal to each other their intended mechanism at the start of the 
pure strategy game. 
4.2. Competition between two firms using vertically differentiated 
products 
Consider two firms (labelled as A and B) that use both the op- 
tions of installed base management and selling in a competitive 
environment. It trivially follows that no non-zero price Nash equi- 
librium can exist if both firms offer the same product, as the firms 
will continue to undercut the other’s price. Hence, we assume that 
firm A offers a better product than firm B, and model the utility 
from firm A’s product as A v ( A > 1). This assumption can be inter- 
preted as the consumer getting a utility of A times the utility from 
firm A’s product compared to firm B’s product for each use. We 
denote the selling price, rent per period and servicing charges of 
firms A and B as p A , r A , s A and p B , r B , s B respectively. We find that 
there are two resultant market structures possible. If the value of A 
is low (slightly above 1), the market shares of the two firms from 
the two different options each are depicted in Fig. 1 . If the value 
of A is significantly higher than one, then the market shares of 
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Fig. 2. Market shares for firms A and B for high values of A . 
the two firms from the two different options each are depicted in 
Fig. 2 . 
In Fig. 1 , the frequency of usage of the marginal consumers v 4 , 
v 3 , v 2 and v 1 are found by setting the utilities from the two neigh- 
boring options to be equal. Hence, 
(1 + δ) v 4 − p B − s B (1 + δ)(v 4 − v 4 ) = 0 ⇒ v 4 = p B 1+ δ
(1 + δ) A v 3 − p A − s A (1 + δ)(v 3 − v 3 ) = (1 + δ) v 3 − p B − s B (1 + 
δ)(v 3 − v 4 ) ⇒ v 3 = p A −p B + s B (1+ δ) v 4 (1+ δ)(A + s B −1) 
(1 + δ) v 2 − (1 + δ) r B = (1 + δ) A v 2 − p A − s A (1 + δ)(v 2 − v 3 ) ⇒ 
v 2 = (1+ δ) r B −p A + s A (1+ δ) v 3 (1+ δ)(−A + s A +1) 
(1 + δ) A v 1 − (1 + δ) r A = (1 + δ) v 1 − (1 + δ) r B ⇒ v 1 = r A −r B A −1 
The profits for firms A and B are given as follows: 




δ(1 − v 1 ) V + (v 2 − v 3 )(p A − c) + (1 + δ) { s A ∫ v 2 v 3 (v − v 3 ) dv −
x 
∫ v 2 
v 3 
v dv } 
max p B ,r B ,s B B = (v 1 − v 2 ) { (1 + δ) r B − c} − (1 + δ) x 
∫ v 1 
v 2 
ydy + 
δ(v 1 − v 2 ) V + (v 3 − v 4 )(p B − c) + (1 + δ) { s B ∫ v 3 v 4 (v − v 4 ) dv −
x 
∫ v 3 
v 4 
v dv } 
The values of v 1 , v 2 , v 3 and v 4 and the corresponding profits 
for the market structure in Fig. 2 can be characterized analogously, 
and the characterizations are omitted for brevity. This problem is 
not analytically tractable, hence, we solve for the optimal values of 
p A , r A , s A and p B , r B , s B numerically. We conducted sensitivity anal- 
ysis for the equilibrium outcomes for x and A (in all the numerical 
solutions for varying x , we use the following values of A , δ, c , and 
V : A = [1 . 4 , 1 . 8] , δ = 0 . 95 , c = 0 . 3 , V = 0 . 1 ). The results are sum- 
marized below. 
Case 1: x < 0.5. When the value of the servicing cost x is small, 
we observe that both firms prefer not to use the servicing charge 
in the selling policy ( s A , s B ≈ 0), hence, both firms prefer to com- 
pete using the installed base option only. Note that in the absence 
of the servicing charge s , the installed base management and sell- 
ing options converge to the same option (using a single payment 
tariff). The intuition behind these results is similar to the case ob- 
tained above, in the pure strategy case. When the value of x is 
small, both firms find that they optimize their profits by not using 
a servicing charge, and gaining a higher market share using the in- 
stalled base policy only. As the value of x increases, firm B finds it 
optimal to keep its servicing charge at 0, while firm A charges a 
nominally higher value of servicing charge, the bulk of the profits 
and market share of firms A and B still come from the installed 
base policy. The findings are summarized in Fig. 3 (a). 
Case 2: 0.5 < x < 1. When the value of the servicing cost x is 
large, we observe that both firms use both the installed base and 
selling policies in tandem in a competitive environment. Similar to 
the case of the competition with pure strategies described above, 
firm A charges a high servicing charge, and extracts most of the 
surplus utility from consumers who buy its product. In contrast, 
firm B charges a lower servicing charge, as it finds it better in 
this case in equilibrium to have a higher market share from selling 
its product compared to the case when x is low. Both firms get a 
higher share of their profits from using the installed base policy in 
this case as well compared to the selling policy. The findings are 
summarized in Fig. 3 (b). 
When the value of A increases (firm A’s product is significantly 
better than firm B’s product), as expected, we find that the mar- 
ket structure switches to Fig. 2 . The intuition behind the switch 
is as follows. When the value of A is low (slightly higher than 1), 
consumers with a higher frequency of usage prefer to use the in- 
stalled base mechanism from firm B in preference to buying the 
product from firm A. The intuition behind the preference is that in 
this region, the additional servicing and maintenance cost from the 
selling contract of firm B is higher, and overcomes the additional 
utility of the A v factor ( A > 1) from buying the product of firm A. 
As the value of A goes higher, the additional utility of buying the 
product from firm A with a utility of A v gets to be higher for con- 
sumers with higher frequency, overshadowing the additional cost 
of servicing and maintenance of the product, and consumers with 
a higher frequency prefer to purchase the product from firm A. The 
findings are summarized in Fig. 4 . 
However, even though both firms use both mechanisms in these 
cases, in both cases, the firms earn higher profits from the installed 
base management mechanism in contrast to the selling mecha- 
nism, as consumers with the higher frequency of usage prefer to 
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Fig. 3. Profits for firms A and B for (a) x < 0 . 5 , A = 1 . 4 , c = 0 . 3 , δ = 0 . 95 , V = 0 . 1 and (b) x > 0 . 5 , A = 1 . 4 , c = 0 . 3 , δ = 0 . 95 , V = 0 . 1 . 
Please cite this article as: S. Bhattacharya et al., Installed base management versus selling in monopolistic and competitive environments, 
European Journal of Operational Research (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.038 
8 S. Bhattacharya et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 0 0 0 (2018) 1–12 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: EOR [m5G; September 28, 2018;16:4 ] 
Fig. 4. Profits for firms A and B for (a) x < 0 . 5 , A = 1 . 8 , c = 0 . 3 , δ = 0 . 95 , V = 0 . 1 and (b) x > 0 . 5 , A = 1 . 8 , c = 0 . 3 , δ = 0 . 95 , V = 0 . 1 . 
use the installed base mechanism. Hence, the intuition behind our 
results does not change. 
We now summarize the results of the paper, and outline direc- 
tions for future research. 
5. Conclusions and directions for future research 
Using the policy of installed base management against selling 
has important ramifications for the firm’s profits. The contribution 
of this paper to the literature is a model that studies the ben- 
efits of retaining the ownership of the product through leasing 
in conjunction with providing repair and maintenance services to 
the consumer. The model incorporates the utility to the consumer 
based on usage frequency rather than instantaneous consumption, 
and analyzes the cost of internalizing servicing expenses against 
the benefit of retaining ownership of the products in monopolistic 
and competitive environments. 
The results of the paper show that for the manufacturer, using 
the selling policy is better than installed base management in a 
monopoly, as providing a servicing contract that is separate from 
the price of the product increases the servicing price charged by 
the manufacturer. The manufacturer can extract the entire con- 
sumer utility surplus even when consumers have heterogeneous 
frequencies of usage, and the servicing charge acts as a price dis- 
criminating tool for the manufacturer. In contrast, in the installed 
base policy case, the firm internalizes the costs of servicing, and 
the market share for the manufacturer is also lower, hence, if there 
is no salvage value of the product at the end of the time horizon, 
the profits from the installed base option are lower than the profits 
from the selling option. 
If two manufacturers compete with each other and both use 
identical products, this paper shows that the two firms only have 
non-zero profits in equilibrium if they use different strategies, and 
no equilibrium exists if both firms use the same strategy either 
alone or in a combination with the other strategy. The efficacy of 
the installed base policy is higher than in the monopoly case, while 
the efficacy of the selling policy is lower than in the monopoly 
case. If two firms use differentiated products in a duopoly, they 
can use both mechanisms in conjunction, but the efficacy of the 
installed base mechanism is higher than that of the selling mech- 
anism. This owes to the fact that in a competitive environment, 
the firm using the selling policy has to lower its servicing charge 
to balance for the consumer utility surplus offered by the installed 
base policy to gain additional market share. The lowered servic- 
ing charge greatly reduces the profit potential of the selling option, 
hence, it is not as attractive as it is in a monopoly. 
To illustrate the results, copiers are a good case in point, as in- 
deed, Xerox was the first manufacturer to move to a “lease only”
policy, by taking advantage of a competitive environment and im- 
provements in servicing technologies (lower x ). Xerox was also the 
first manufacturer in their sector to introduce remanufacturing to 
extract further surpluses from their installed base policy. There are 
many other examples in other sectors of manufacturers moving to 
an installed base policy from a selling policy under similar condi- 
tions, such as Otis Elevators, HP Servers, and Douwe Egberts coffee 
machines. 
In the early phase of this research, we have made a number 
of assumptions that should be relaxed in future research. We have 
assumed that there are no secondary markets. Future research 
should study the impact of secondary markets on the choice 
between installed base management and selling. We conjecture 
that the existence of secondary markets will help selling more, as 
consumers can effectively get a trade-in value in the secondary 
market, and purchasing the new product generation will then be 
more attractive. We have also assumed that there is no setup cost 
if the manufacturer operates on an installed base policy. Future 
research should consider the impact of setup costs on the policy 
decision. We conjecture that the existence of setup costs in the 
installed base case would require a minimum cutoff number of 
consumers using the product with a frequency above a certain 
usage frequency for the manufacturer to operate with an installed 
base policy. We also assumed that the maintenance costs increase 
as the frequency of usage increases. Empirical work to test this 
assumption would be useful to determine the applicability of 
the model in other sectors than the ones that inspired our as- 
sumptions (such as copiers and cars). We also did not take into 
account design cost aspects in the reduction of the servicing cost 
or creation of dominant designs using the installed base policy. We 
also model the installed base policy as a lease payment coupled 
with an extended warranty that includes all maintenance services, 
while in the selling option, the maintenance contract is sold sepa- 
rately. The bundling of the maintenance service with the leasing is 
an important aspect driving the results of the paper. We also did 
not take into account design cost aspects in the reduction of the 
servicing cost or creation of dominant designs using the installed 
base policy. While the selling and installed base mechanisms were 
compared from the maintenance contract added on in this paper, 
we did not account for the impact of complementary products and 
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the potential of upgrades on these mechanisms. Future research 
should take these factors into account. 
In summary, this paper makes a contribution to the literature 
and practice of installed base management by pointing out the im- 
pact of production costs, servicing costs, competition and reman- 
ufacturing on the policy choice between installed base manage- 
ment and selling. Our recommendation is that manufacturers make 
a conscious and proactive policy choice, as our results show that 
different policies are appropriate in different environments. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition (1). V denotes the salvage value of the prod- 
uct. The problem of the manufacturer if it offers the product using 
installed base management is given by: 
max 
r 
IB = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} − x (1 + δ) 
∫ 1 
v r 
ydy + δ(1 − v r ) V 
s.t. v r = r (6) 
The profits reduce to IB = (1 − r) { (1 + δ)(r − (c − δV )) } −
x 
2 (1 + δ)(1 − r 2 ) . The first order condition (FOC) with re- 
spect to r gives −2(1 + δ) r + (1 + δ) + c − δV + (1 + δ) rx = 0 , 
hence, r ∗ = (1+ δ)+ c−δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) . Substituting r 
∗ back into IB gives 
∗
IB = [(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c+ δV ] 
2 
2(1+ δ)(2 −x ) . 
Proof of Proposition (2). If the manufacturer uses the selling pol- 
icy, the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing or not 
purchasing the product has utility v b such that v b (1 + δ) − p + 
s (1 + δ)(v b − v b ) = 0 , or v b = p (1+ δ) . The problem of the manufac- 
turer is given by 
max 
p,s 











s.t. v b (1 + δ) − p = 0 
The profit function reduces to SE = (1 − p 1+ δ )(p − c) + (1 + 
δ) { s (1 −v b ) 2 2 − x 1 −v b 
2 
2 } 
= (1 − p 
1+ δ )[(p − c) + (1 + δ) { s 1 −v b 2 − x 1+ v b 2 } ] . 
It is trivial to see that s ∗ = 1 , as the derivative of the profit 
function w.r.t s is strictly increasing. 
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to p gives 
(1 − p 
1+ δ ) { 1 − 1 2 − x 2 } − 1 1+ δ [(p − c) + (1 + δ) { 1 −v b 2 − x 1+ v b 2 } ] = 
0 . 
⇒ p∗ = c 1 −x . 
Substituting p ∗ back into SE gives ∗SE = [(1+ δ)(1 −x ) −c] 
2 
2(1+ δ)(1 −x ) . 
Proof of Proposition (3). If the monopolist uses both the 
installed base and selling policies, her profits are give by 
max r,p IB and SE = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} − (1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
v r ydy + δ(1 −
v r ) V + (v r − v b )(p − c) + (1 + δ) { s 
∫ v r 
v b 
(v − v b ) dv − x 
∫ v r 
v b 
v dv } , where 
v r is given by the equation v r = v b + r−v b s and v b = p 1+ δ . The FOC 
of the above profit function are given by: 
∂IB and SE 
∂s = (1 − v r )(1 + δ) x 2 
r−v b 
s 2 
+ r−v b 
s 2 
[(1 + δ) r − c + δV (1 + 
δ) x 2 − (1 + δ) x 2 v r − p + c − (1 + δ) s 2 (v r − v b ) + (1 + δ) x 2 (v r + v b ) + 
(1 + δ) x 2 (v r − v b )] . 
After simplification, this reduces to 





δ) r 2 − p 2 + δV ] . 0 as r > p and V > 0. Hence, s ∗ = 1 . 
The FOC for r and p are: (1 + δ) − (1 + δ) r s − δV s − p + p s = 0 . 
Substituting the value of s ∗ = 1 in the above FOC yields the de- 
sired results. The profits are found by substituting the optimal pa- 
rameters in the profit function. 
Table 1 
Nash equilibrium outcomes when firms can use either or both mechanisms. 
Firm 1 
Selling IBM Both 
Selling No equilibrium Equilibrium exists No equilibrium 
Firm 2 IBM Equilibrium exists No equilibrium No equilibrium 
Both No equilibrium No equilibrium No equilibrium 
Result 1 : There exists no Nash equilibrium with the two firms hav- 
ing positive profits if both of them employ the same mechanism either 
alone or in conjunction with the other mechanism. 
Proof of Result 1. Table 1 below summarizes the possible strate- 
gies used by both parties in equilibrium. 
Case 1: Firm 1 uses only selling, Firm 2 uses only installed 
base mechanism 
Consider a duopoly where firm 1 only uses the selling mech- 
anism, and firm 2 only uses the installed base mechanism to of- 
fer the durable good. The selling price charged by the selling firm 
1 is denoted as p and the service charge per period is denoted 
as s . The rent charged by the firm using the installed base pol- 
icy is denoted as r . Hence, the utility to the consumer from sell- 
ing is U S (p, s ) = (1 + δ) v − p − (1 + δ) s (v − v b ) and U IB (r) = (1 + 
δ)(v − r) . The marginal consumer between the selling and installed 
base policies is characterized by the frequency of usage where 
these utilities are equal and denoted by v r : v r = v b + r−v b s . Setting 
the utility of the consumer to 0 gives us the marginal consumer 
who buys the product: v b = p 1+ δ . The expressions for the market 
shares of the selling and installed base mechanisms are v r − v b and 
1 − v r respectively. 
The competing firms maximize their individual profits: 
max 
r 
IB = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} 
−(1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
v r 
ydy + δ(1 − v r ) V (8) 
max 
p,s 
SE = (v r − v b )(p − c) 
+(1 + δ) 
{
s 
∫ v r 
v b 
(v − v b ) dv − x 




s.t. v r = p 
1 + δ + 
r − p 
1+ δ
s 
and v b = 
p 
1 + δ
To see that this game yields a unique asymmetric Nash equi- 
librium, it is sufficient to check the SOC (second-order conditions) 
are satisfied at the Nash equilibrium. It can be easily seen that the 
SOC for IB with respect to r and the SOC for S with respect to 
p and s are satisfied. 
Case 2: Firm 1 uses only selling, Firm 2 uses only selling 
If the firms each only use the selling mechanism, let the selling 
price charged by firm 1 be denoted by p 1 and the selling price of 
firm 2 be denoted by p 2 . Let the service charges of the two firms 
be denoted by S 1 and S 2 . Let the profits of firm 1 be denoted by 
S 1 ( p 1 , p 2 , s 1 , s 2 ) and the profits of firm 2 be denoted by S 2 (( p 1 , 
p 2 , s 1 , s 2 )). Hence, U(S 1 ) = (1 + δ) v − p 1 − s 1 (1 + δ)(v − v b ) and 
U(S 2 ) = (1 + δ) v − p 2 − s 2 (1 + δ)(v − v b ) . 
It is easy to see that p 1 > p 2 and s 1 > s 2 cannot be a Nash equi- 
librium, as in that case U S 1 < U S 2 always. The same is true if p 1 < p 2 
and s 1 < s 2 . Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that 
p 1 > p 2 and s 1 < s 2 . U ( S 1 ) > U ( S 2 ) implies that v − v b > p 1 −p 2 (1+ δ)(s 2 −s 1 ) . 
Hence, if v s is the marginal consumer between buying products 
1 and 2, v s = v b + p 1 −p 2 (1+ δ)(s 2 −s 1 ) . The marginal consumer for prod- 
uct 2 is given by v b = p 2 1+ δ as before, and is obtained by setting 
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U(S 2 ) = 0 . Hence, consumers with a usage frequency from v s to 1 
buy product 1, and consumers with a usage frequency of v b to v s 
purchase product 2. 
The profits of the two firms are given as follows: 
max 
p 1 ,s 1 
1 = (1 − v s )(p 1 − c) 











p 2 ,s 2 
2 = (v s − v b )(p − c) 
+(1 + δ) 
{
s 2 
∫ v s 
v b 
(v − v b ) dv − x 





The solution to the FOC in the Nash equilibrium is p 1 = s 1 = 
p 2 = s 2 = 0 , demonstrating that a Nash equilibrium with non-zero 
prices and profits does not exist when each firm employs only sell- 
ing. 
Case 3: Firm 1 and firm 2 each use only installed base man- 
agement 
Let the rent charged by firm 1 be denoted by r 1 and the rent 
of firm 2 be denoted by r 2 . Let the profits of firm 1 be denoted 
by IB 1 ( r 1 , r 2 ) and the profits of firm 2 be denoted by IB 2 ( r 1 , 
r 2 ). A necessary condition for the Nash equilibrium (with non-zero 
profits for both firms) to exist is (here r ∗1 and r 
∗
2 are the Nash equi- 
librium prices): 
IB 1 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 1 (r 
∗
1 + ε, r ∗2 ) 
and 
IB 1 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 1 (r 
∗
1 − ε, r ∗2 ) 
IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 + ε) 
and 
IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 − ε) 
That is, both firms should have no incentive to deviate from the 
Nash equilibrium prices. 
The net surpluses of a consumer who uses the durable good on 
an installed base from firm 1 and firm 2 are, respectively: 
U IB 1 (r 1 ) = (1 + δ)(v − r 1 ) 
U IB 2 (r 2 ) = (1 + δ)(v − r 2 ) 
If the durable good is not vertically differentiated, it is easy to 
see that if r 1 
 = r 2 , the entire market share goes to the firm with the 
lower rent, and the other firm is left with zero profits. This leads 
to price undercutting, as if r 1 is lower than r 2 (and vice versa), 
the entire market share goes to firm 1 (firm 2 respectively). Hence, 
unequal values of r 1 and r 2 do not constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Now, let us assume that ( r ∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium and let 
r ∗1 = r ∗2 = r ∗, where 0 ≤ r ∗ ≤ 1. Because the net consumer surplus for 
both firms is equal, we can conclude that the market shares for 
both firms are equal. Then: 
IB 1 (r 1 
∗, r ∗2 ) 
= (1 − r 
∗) 
2 
{ (1 + δ) r − c} − (1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
r 
ydy + δ(1 − r) V 
and 
IB 2 (r 1 
∗, r ∗2 ) = 
(1 − r ∗) 
2 
{ (1 + δ) r − c} 
−(1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
r 
ydy + δ(1 − r) V 
In this case, the conditions IB 1 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 1 (r 
∗
1 − ε, r ∗2 ) and 
IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 ) > IB 2 (r 
∗
1 , r 
∗
2 − ε) are not satisfied for all r ∗ > 0. If ε = 
lim 
h → 0 
h, for firm 1, then: 
IB 1 (r 1 
∗ − lim 
h → 0 
h, r ∗2 ) 
= (1 − r) { (1 + δ) r − c} − (1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
r 
ydy + δ(1 − r) V 
> 
(1 − r ∗
2 
) { (1 + δ) r − c} − (1 + δ) x 
∫ 1 
r 
ydy + δ(1 − r) V 
A symmetric condition holds for firm 2. Therefore, there is a 
contradiction and a Nash equilibrium with non-zero prices and 
profits do not exist when each firm employs only the installed base 
mechanism. 
The proofs that demonstrate that other mechanism combina- 
tions in the duopoly lead to no-equilibrium outcomes follow along 
similar lines. Those proofs can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
Proof of Proposition (4). In a duopoly, v r and v b are given by 
the equations v r = v b + r−v b s and v b = p 1+ δ . The firm using the 
installed base policy has profits of IB = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c} −
(1 + δ) x ∫ 1 v r ydy + δ(1 − v r ) V = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c + δV − x 2 (1 + δ)(1 + v r ) } . (A4.1) 
The profit of the firm using the selling option is SE = (v r −
v b )(p − c) + (1 + δ) { s 
∫ v r 
v b 
(v − v b ) dv − x 
∫ v r 
v b 
v dv } . 
= (v r − v b )[ p − c + (1 + δ) s 2 (v r − v b ) − (1 + δ) x 2 (v r + v b )] . 
(A4.2) 
Note that IB is quadratic in r , and of the form 
IB = (D − r s ) { Er + K} . where D = 1 + v b ( 1 s − 1) , E = 
(1 + δ)(1 − x 2 s ) , K = −c + δV − x 2 (1 + δ) + x 2 (1 + δ) v b ( 1 s − 1) 
The equilibrium reaction function r from the FOC is then given 
by: 
r ∗ = sDE−K 2 E 
⇒ r ∗ = s (1+ δ)+ p(1 −s )+ c−δV −px ( 
1 
s −1) 
(1+ δ)(2 − x s ) 
and the profits of the firm us- 
ing the installed base policy in equilibrium are given by: 
∗
IB = (D − r 
∗
s ) { Er ∗ + K} . 
Similarly, SE is quadratic in p , and of the form 
SE = 1 s (r − p 1+ δ ) { F P + G } where F = 1 2 − x + x 2 s , G = r (1+ δ) 2 (1 −
x 
s ) − c. 
The equilibrium reaction function p from the FOC is then given 
by: 
p ∗ = (1+ δ) F r−G 2 F 
⇒ p ∗ = (1+ δ) rx + cs −(1+ δ) rxs s + x −2 sx and the profits of the firm using the 
selling policy in equilibrium are given by: 
∗
SE = 1 s [ F r(1+ δ)+ G ] 
2 
4 F (1+ δ) . 
Simplifying ∗
SE by substituting the reaction function p 
∗ gives 
us: 
∗SE = [(1+ δ) r(1 −x ) −c] 
2 
(1+ δ)(s + x −2 sx ) . 
Case 1: If 0 < x ≤ 1 2 , then ∗SE is maximized by minimizing the 
value of (s + x − 2 sx ) since ∗
SE = [(1+ δ) r(1 −x ) −c] 
2 
(1+ δ)(s + x −2 sx ) , and s 
∗ = 1 . 
Substituting s ∗ = 1 in the equilibrium reaction functions r ∗ and 
p ∗ and simplifying the resulting profit functions gives us the result 
in the proposition. 
Case 2: If 1 2 < x ≤ 1 − c, then the value of ∗SE is maximized by 
minimizing the value of (s + x − 2 sx ) since ∗
SE = [(1+ δ) r(1 −x ) −c] 
2 
(1+ δ)(s + x −2 sx ) . 
(s + x − 2 sx ) = s (1 − 2 x ) + x ⇒ (s + x − 2 sx ) is minimized 
when s = 0 ⇒ s ∗ = 0 . 
Substituting s ∗ = 0 the equilibrium reaction function p ∗ gives: 
p ∗ = (1 + δ) r. 
Hence, for the seller, the equilibrium reaction functions are 
given by: p ∗ = (1 + δ) r and s ∗ = 0 
⇒ Both firms offer the same one-part tariff structure, hence, 
consumers choose the tariff structure that is cheaper, and only one 
mechanism can exist in the market. 
The consumer utility surplus for the installed base and selling 
policies are given by: 
U IB (v ) = (1 + δ)(v − r) , U SE (v ) = (1 + δ) v − p. 
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Table 2 
Payoff matrix if one firm uses selling, competitor uses 
IBM. 
Profits for firms in mixed equilibrium strategy 
sell IBM 
sell (0,0) (s , IB ) 
IBM (IB , S ) (0,0) 
If (1 + δ) r > p, then the firm using the installed base policy is 
priced out, while if (1 + δ) r < p, the selling policy is priced out. 
If the installed base policy offers a higher utility than selling, 
IB = (1 − v r ) { (1 + δ) r − c + δV − x 2 (1 + δ)(1 + v r ) } . 
Since U IB (v ) = (1 + δ)(v − r) , if the installed base policy is the 
only mechanism in the market, the lowest value of r is given by: 
IB > 0 ⇒ (1 + δ) r − c + δV − x 2 (1 + δ)(1 + r) > 0 
⇒ r ∗
min = 2 c−2 δV + x (1+ δ) (1+ δ)(2 −x ) , since v r = r. 
Similarly, if the selling policy is the only mechanism in the mar- 
ket, since U SE (v ) = (1 + δ) v − p, 
SE = (1 − p 1+ δ )[ p − c − (1 + δ) x 2 (1 + 
p 
1+ δ )] since s 
∗ = 0 
⇒ p ∗
min = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x ⇒ (1 + δ) r ∗min = 2 c−2 δV + x (1+ δ) (2 −x ) < p ∗min 
⇒ p ∗ = p ∗
min = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x 
(1 + δ) r ∗ = p ∗
min − ε, ε −→ 0 . 
Substituting the values of r ∗, p ∗ and s ∗ = 0 in the profit func- 
tions gives us the result in the proposition. 
To show that r ∗, p ∗ and s ∗ constitute an equilibrium, note that 
if the selling firm uses a servicing charge, we have shown that the 
equilibrium reaction function s ∗ of the selling firm is given by s ∗ = 
0 . 
(i) p < p ∗ = p ∗
min : For the selling firm, p 
∗ = p ∗
min = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x . 
If p ∗ < p ∗
min , SE < 0 since SE = (1 −
p 
1+ δ )[ p − c − (1 + δ) x 2 (1 + 
p 
1+ δ )] and p − c − (1 + δ) x 2 (1 + 
p 
1+ δ ) < 0 if p 
∗ < p ∗
min . 
(ii) p > p ∗ = p ∗
min : If p 
∗ > p ∗
min , the market share of the selling 
firm is still zero as p 
1+ δ > r 
∗ = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x − ε. 
(iii) r > r ∗ : For the firm using the installed base policy, if r > 
r ∗ = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x − ε, then IB = 0 , as r > p 
∗
1+ δ . 
(iv) r < r ∗: Note that in the monopoly, the optimal rent is given 
by (1+ δ)+ c−δV 
(1+ δ)(2 −x ) from Proposition 1 . 
In the duopoly, r ∗ = 2 c+ x (1+ δ) 2 −x − ε < (1+ δ)+ c−δV (1+ δ)(2 −x ) as x + c < 1 by 
assumption. 
Hence, r < r ∗ results in lower profits for the firm in 
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 5. To find the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
profile of the normal game in Tabel 2 , let the profit of the seller 
from this asymmetric Nash equilibrium be SE and the profit of 
the firm using the installed base mechanism be IB . Then, we have 
the following payoff matrix for the two firms: 
From Dixit and Shapiro (1986) , each firm can also adopt a 
mixed strategy in a Nash equilibrium, in which the probability σ SE 
of selling makes the other firm indifferent between the selling and 
installed base mechanisms: 
σSE (0) + (1 − σSE )SE = σSE IB + (1 − σSE )(0) 
σSE = SE 
SE + IB 
Therefore, in the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, each firm 
chooses the selling mechanism with a probability of σSE = SE SE +IB 
and the installed base mechanism with a probability of 1 − σSE = 
IB 
SE +IB . 
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